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COMMENCEMENT OF A CIVIL ACTION IN OHIO
FOR APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
JOHN R. EASTMAN* AND FRANK E. KANE'
A cause of action is saved from the bar of the statute of limitations
as soon as suit is "commenced."' It is not ordinarily difficult to determine
the time of commencement for this purpose, for the Ohio Revised Code
expressly fixes it. Section 2305.17 (11230, 11231) provides:
An action is commenced within the meaning of sections
2305.03 to 2305.22, inclusive, and section 1307.08 of the Re-
vised Code, as to each defendant, at the date of the summons
which is served on him or on a codefendant who is a joint
contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him. When
service by publication is proper, the action is commenced at the
date of the first publication, if it is regularly made.
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to com-
mence an action is equivalent to its commencement, when the
party diligently endeavors to procure a service, if such attempt
is followed by service within sixty days. (Emphasis added.)
The section has presented problems of construction and application.
In passing, it may be well to note that this section determines the time of
commencement of the action only for the purpose of the statute of
limitations,2 and that only this section fixes the time of commencement
for that purpose.' There seems to be some degree of confusion on this
proposition, probably because Ohio Revised Code Section 2703.01 (11279)
determines the time of commencement of the action for other purposes.
This section reads: "A civil action must be commenced by filing in the
office of the clerk of the proper court a petition, and causing a summons
to issue thereon."
The supreme court has said that this section provides the manner
of commencing all civil actions,4 but it is equally clear that it fixes the
time of commencement for purposes other than the statute of limitations.'
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2 Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U.S. 299 (1939) (construing OHIO
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4 Ibid.
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Of course, summons must issue within the period of the statute of
limitations; the date of the summons is the date of issuance, 6 and this date
becomes the date of commencement, if the summons is thereafter served.
But issuance of summons so dated does not, without service, commence
the action and arrest the statute of limitations.
7
WHEN THE FIRST SUMMONS IS SERVED.
In accordance with Section 2305.17 the action is commenced at the
date of the summons which is served upon the defendant or upon a
codefendant who is a joint contractor, or "otherwise united in interest
with him." Service of the summons is therefore a necessary part of the
commencement, although it does not occur until some time after the date
so fixed as the commencement of the action, and though service occurs
after the expiration of the statute of limitations.' Where publication is
proper, the date of the first publication regularly made is the date of
commencement, 9 notwithstanding the fact that the court does not acquire
jurisdiction of the res until publication is complete.
Moreover, the commencement of the action by the plaintiff saves any
proper counterclaim of the defendant from the bar of the statute of
limitations, provided the statute of limitations has not run on the counter-
claim at the date of commencement.' 0 If the defendant's counterclaim
arises out of the same event or transaction as the plaintiff's cause of action,
it may very well be governed by the same statute of limitations. For ex-
ample, in an automobile collision case both the plaintiff and defendant
may have personal injury and property damage claims, all of which will
be governed by the two year statute of limitations of Section 2305.10
(11224-1). A contrary rule would permit either party to delay suit to
the last moment, secure service on a summons dated just before the
statute expired, and then plead the bar of the statute to the claim of the
other (who may have been willing to forego his claim to avoid litigation).
A further effect of the plaintiff's commencement by service upon one
defendant, is to preserve his claim against all other defendants who are
joint contractors with the defendant served, or who are "otherwise united
in interest with him." This may be of considerable practical aid to the
plaintiff in a case in which the necessary defendants are numerous, so
that it is diflicult to obtain individual service of summons upon them
before the statute of limitations expires. If he can secure service of sum-
6 OHIO REv. ConE §2703.03 (11281).
7 Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E. 2d 285 (1954); Crandall v.
Irwin, supra note 3.
8 McDonald v. Ketchum, 53 Ohio St. 519, 42 N.E. 322 (1895); Early and
Daniels v. Gilliland Grain Co., 72 Ohio St. 600, 76 N.E. 1124 (1905).
9 Pilgrim Distributing Corp. v. Galsworthy, 148 Ohio St. 567, 76 N.E. 2d
382 (1947).
10 National Retailers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 142 Ohio St. 132, 50 N.E. 2d
258 (1943). And see Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E. 2d 391
(1953), and Kocsorak v. Cleveland Trust, 151 Ohio St. 212, 85 N.E. 2d 96 (1949).
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mons on at least one defendant of each necessary group whose interests so
coincide as to make them "united in interest," his action is commenced as
to the entire group, and he may thereafter perfect service on the rest of
them and so bring them within the jurisdiction of the court for his relief.
It may not be easy to determine whether the defendants not yet served
are "joint contractors" or are "united in interest" with the defendant who
has been served.
The supreme court has said that statutes of limitations should be
liberally construed," but the construction given these phrases is reasonably
strict. Before the defendants will be held to be united in interest under
Section 2305.17, their interest in the subject of the law suit must be
nearly identical. For example, the supreme court has held that the vendor
and vendee of real property are both necessary parties to an action to can-
cel a deed for fraud, but that they are not "united in interest" within the
meaning of 2305.17.12 In an action against joint mortgagors the de-
fendants were held to be united in interest.13 In an action for wrongful
death against drivers of different automobiles, such defendants, as might
have been expected, were held not to be "united in interest." 4
The type of case in which this question most frequently occurs is
the will contest. Here, of course, the heirs, attacking the will, are directly
opposed in interest to the legatees and devisees who will take under it if
it is supported. Rather clearly the heirs are not "united in interest" with
the legatees and devisees. The executor takes his power and authority
from the will, and -to this extent at least his interest lies with that of the
legatees and devisees. Moreover, since testators most frequently select as
executor a member of the family who is also named legatee or devisee, and
who would take as an heir in the event the will were set aside, it is often
true that his personal financial interest and sympathy will align him in fact
with the one side or the other when the will is contested.
In several cases the supreme court has considered whether the ex-
ecutor is "united in interest" within the meaning of Section 2305.17 with
any of the other necessary parties to the suit, and in these cases has fur-
nished the best available guide to interpretation of the phrase. In McCord
v. McCord5 all necessary parties were named defendant, but summons
was requested and served only upon the executor. The plaintiff made an
effort to secure service by publication on the heirs, legatees and devisees,
but after the time then provided for bringing an action to contest the will
had expired. He claimed that the service on the executor of summons
dated before the statute of limitations expired constituted service upon all
the defendants, but the action was held barred. The supreme court said
that the executor, as such, is not united in interest either with the heirs or
11 E.g., Draher v. Walters, 130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935).
12 Moore v. Chittenden, 39 Ohio St. 563 (1883).
13 Totten v. Lawton, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 377, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 518 (1894).
14 Knight v. Schlachter, 28 Ohio App. 70, 162 N.E. 244 (1927).
IS 104 Ohio St. 274, 135 N.E. 548 (1922).
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with the legatees or devisees (here the executor was a bank which had no
individual interest in the estate). Upon reaching its conclusion, the court
held that the action was not commenced as against the other heirs or
against the devisees or legatees by service upon the executor. In 1935
the supreme court decided Draher v. Walters."8 In this case one of the
legatees was served with summons within the statutory time, but the clerk
of courts did not issue summons for the other legatees and devisees or
for the executor. The plaintiff, discovering the omission, secured service
on the other parties by alias summons issued after time for contest had
expired, so that all necessary parties were in court, but the legatees claimed
the bar of the statute of limitations. The court held that the initial service
on one legatee commenced the action as to all the legatees-devisees, who
were considered to be "united in interest" with him. And further, upon
the principle of liberal construction, a majority of the court held that the
timely service upon the one legatee was sufficient to commence the action
against the executor, who was said to be the "shadow" which followed
the "substance." Very little more is said in explanation of this decision,
which either means that the executor was "united in interest" with the
others, or that commencement of the action, as to him, was unimportant.
In the fairly recent case of Peters v. Moore,"7 the Draher case was
overruled so far as it held the executor united in interest with the legatees
and devisees. In this case the plaintiff mistakenly assumed that the ex-
ecutor nominated in the will had been appointed, and in filing his petition
named the nominee as a party defendant. The nominee had declined,
and a contingent executrix who was also an heir at law and a legatee
under the will, had been appointed and was serving. The plaintiff obtained
service on the assumed executor and on the person who was contingent
executrix, but as an individual. After the date for instituting contest of
the will had expired, plaintiff discovered his error, amended his petition
to name the true executrix, and obtained service by alias summons upon
her. There was thus presented the question whether the "official capacity"
of the executrix was "united in interest" with her "individual capacity,"
so that the timely service upon her as an individual commenced the action
as to the executrix. The supreme court held that the two positions which
'she occupied in the case were not "united in interest" and accordingly
that the service of summons upon her as an individual did not commence
the action against her as an executrix. Under the will involved in the
case, the legatee-executrix would have received substantially all of the
estate, whereas she would have taken half of it as an heir at law if the
will had been set aside. Beyond noting these facts in the statement of the
case the court did not comment upon it. (In the other two cases men-
tioned, the financial results to the parties involved are not even pointed
out.) The court evidently does not consider actual benefit to be important.
16130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935).
'T 154 Ohio St. 177, 95 N.E. 2d 683 (1950).
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It is probably not safe to generalize from the cases so far decided
what the term "otherwise united in interest" means in Section 2307.17.
In the McCord case Judge Matthias said:
The word "united" means joined or combined, made one;
allied. "United in interest" means identity of interest, and that
can exist only as to parties who would be similarly affected by
the same general result of the litigation-in this instance, those
benefited by the sustaining of the will, or those benefited by
setting it aside. Codefendants are "united in interest" therefore
only when they are similarly interested in and will be similarly
affected by the determination of the issue involved in the action.1
8
It is clearly not enough that the codefendants be necessary parties in
the case, and beyond that, it would not seem to matter that their natural,
advantage coincides, unless their legal rights will be affected by the
determination in the same way.
WHEN THE FiRsT SUMMONS Is NoT PROPERLY SERVED.
Assume that the plaintiff has caused summons to issue bearing a date
before the statute of limitations e4ires, and that the sheriff is unable to
serve it. If there is still time under the statute of limitations for the
plaintiff to have an alias summons issued, which is thereafter served,
he has, of course, commenced his action as of the date of the second
summons.19 And even though the statute of limitations on his cause of
action has expired when he learns that his first summons has not been
served, he has a further opportunity to get his case "commenced" if he
can proceed under the second paragraph of Revised Code Section 2305.17
(11231). This reads: "Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt
to commence an action is equivalent to its commencement, when the
party diligently endeavors to procure a service, if such attempt is followed
by service within sixty days."
This section obviously leaves a good deal to interpretation; nowhere
in the code is the word "attempt" defined, although common sense indi-
cates that it means some effort to obtain service- taken before the statute
of limitations expires. By the terms of the statute, the party attempting to
"commence" the action must diligently endeavor to procure service of his
summons and must, in fact, obtain good service within sixty days. When
he has complied with these requirements, the action is commenced at the
date of the attempt. This savings clause does not purport to extend or toll
the statute of limitations, although it is sometimes referred to as a
"tolling.""2
18 104 Ohio St. at 279.
19 Hubbard v. Geo. F. Alger Co., 51 Ohio App. 405, 1 N.E. 2d 325 (1935).
20 E.g, Annot. 27 A.L.R. 2d 242, 278 (1953). Accuracy of concept is of
some importance. Where the limitation period is said to be a "part of the right,"
the right exists only through this period, and then is extinguished; it is not
simply barred by plea of the statute, as in the case of "true" statutes of limitations.
In other contexts, it is said that these periods cannot be tolled or extended. See
Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E. 2d 608 (1942) involving foreclosure
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It is well settled that the date of the attempt is the date of the
summons issued even though not served, or, in other words, the date on
which the action would have been commenced had the attempt been
successful. 2' It follows that this sixty day period given the plaintiff to
effect service after the initial failure runs from this same date, rather
than from the date of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
As an example, if the plaintiff files his petition and praecipe for summons
thirty days before the statute of limitations would run and the summons
is issued dated the same day of his filing, and is not served, he must follow
this attempt with service within sixty days from the date of the first sum-
mons, and if he does not get service until seventy days thereafter, the
action is not commenced in time, even though service is had forty days
after the statute of limitations had run.
The principal difficulty with application of this section has been to
determine what is required of the plaintiff, or, in other words, when he
has done enough to constitute an attempt, with diligent endeavor to pro-
cure a service. Certain mechanical steps are required as a result of a great
many decisions. He must file his petition and praecipe for summons and
cause summons to issue before the statute of limitations expires.22 If he
has not, he has not then made such an attempt as will be "equivalent to its
commencement."
It is not enough that he has done all that he is required to do to put
the machinery of service in motion by filing his petition and praecipe for
summons. The supreme court long ago held that it is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to see that summons is actually issued by the clerk in order to
commence or "attempt" to commence the action; 23 and, although the clerk
of courts is obligated by statute to prepare and issue the summons upon
the filing of the praecipe, his failure or refusal to get it out in time does
not excuse the plaintiff from his obligation to use due diligence to effect
service.
In addition, the plaintiff must, it appears, make certain that the
summons prepared by the clerk complies in all respects with the statutory
requirements of a summons. If the summons prepared is defective, it may,
of course, be set aside on that ground, although delivered to the defendant
in such fashion as would otherwise constitute service. In such event, the
action is not commenced. And, in at least one instance in which a de-
of mechanic's lien; Sabol v. Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 54-5, 76 N.E. 2d 84- (1947), con-
cerning wrongful death action; Case v. Smith, 142 Ohio St. 95, 50 N.E. 2d 142
(1943) on will contest. In §2305.17 the question is avoided by dating back the
time of commencement to the "attempt" which is within the limitation period.
21 B. & 0. R. Co. v. Collins, 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 334 affirmed gvithout opinion,
63 Ohio St. 577 (1900); Osmus v. Baumhardt, 47 Ohio App. 491, 492 N.E. 134
(1933); Bender v. Bender, 39 Ohio App. 547, 177 N.E. 920 (1931).
22 McLarren v. Myers Admr., 87 Ohio St. 88, 100 N.E. 121 (1912); B. & 0. R.
Co. v. Ambach, 55 Ohio St. 553, 45 N.E. 719 (1896).
23 McLarren v. Myers, Admr., supra note 22.
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fective summons was issued within the period of the statute of limitations
and was thereafter followed within sixty days by good service of a valid
alias summons, the trial court, and its appellate court, held that the
defective summons originally issued was not "legal summons," and that
as a result the plaintiff had not made diligent efforts to procure service,
and hence had made no such "attempt" as would permit him the relief of
the sixty day saving clause.24 In this instance the praecipe had not called
for endorsement of the amount claimed in an action for money only, and
the clerk therefore omitted the endorsement. In such case, of course, the
plaintiff has been derelict himself, and initiated the error. Whether the
same result would be reached in case the praecipe was in all respects regu-
lar, and the defect in the summons was the result of the clerk's mistake
alone, may be debatable, but we do not believe it any safer to rely upon
the clerk to prepare the summons correctly than it is to depend upon him
to issue it promptly. If a "legal summons" (i.e., one which complies in
all respects with the statutory requirements of the summons) must issue
in order to constitute an "attempt" at service, and if it is incumbent upon
the plaintiff to "cause summons to issue," any defect at all, however
caused, may defeat him. The plaintiff's attorney who is so close to the
expiration of his statute of limitations that he may have to depend upon the
sixty day saving clause for timely commencement, might well check his
praecipe for summons carefully, and after the filing of the petition and
praecipe, wait for the clerk to prepare the summons, so that he can inspect
it for style of the case, endorsement, signature, seal and date,"5 and see
it physically submitted to the sheriff. If the summons is quashed for defect
in any of these particulars, the plaintiff may find that he has not only
failed to commence his action, but does not have the necessary summons
upon which to predicate later service.
Supposing the plaintiff has made sure of each step, and knows that
good summons is in the sheriff's hands for service, and in time, he has
avoided the first risk, and even if he does not obtain service, he has at
least made a timely attempt, and will have sixty days to obtain service by
alias summons.
The sixty-day period will, in the ordinary case, suffice to give him
notice of any defect with the service of summons. The sheriff's return
is due on the second Monday after issuance of the summons if local
service is attempted,2" or on the third or fourth Monday after issuance if
service has been directed to the sheriff of another county. In practice the
sheriff's return is usually made well before the day it is due. The plaintiff,
if he inspects the return after it is filed with the clerk, will have a sub-
24 Crabbe v. Jones, 33 Ohio Op. 176, 17 Ohio Supp. 189 (1945); Crabbe v.
Hertzig, 66 N.E. 2d 659 (1946).
25 See OHIO REV. CODE §2703.03 (11281) prescribing requisites of summons.
26 OHIO REv. CODE §2703.05 (11283).
2 7 Ibid.
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stantial part of the sixty-day period left for alias service if the return shows
that service was not had, or if the return purports to show good service but
is obviously defective, either in respect to what the sheriff actually did or
in the way he reported what he did. The plaintiff may be able to satisfy
himself that good service has in fact been had, and have the return
amended to show it, or he may get out alias summons to be sure.
If the sheriff's return recites facts which constitute good service,
plaintiff will expect the defendant to appear, and the appearance is due
the third Saturday after the summons is returnable.28 The appearance
date for the defendant will therefore, in any event, still be within the sixty
day period from the date of the summons, and if there is any defect in the
return, plaintiff may learn of it by a motion to quash or other objection to
the jurisdiction filed by defendant. He is put on notice of possible defect
in the service if the defendant fails to appear at all.
Some cases have raised a question whether the plaintiff has exercised
the necessary diligence to have the benefit of the sixty-day saving clause by
waiting during this period without making further efforts to secure service
upon alias summons. In .4rmbruster v. Harrison29 the plaintiff filed his
petition and caused summons to issue shortly before the expiration of the
statute of limitations. After the statute had run, the defendant filed a
motion to quash the summons, for a defect which the supreme court said
should have been obvious to the plaintiff. Instead of causing alias summons
to issue when the return of the sheriff was made, or even after the motion
to quash was filed by the defendant, the plaintiff waited until the trial
court had ruled upon the motion to quash, and when it was sustained,
then filed his praecipe for alias summons, and in fact secured valid service
within the sixty-day period. The defendant was arguing that the plaintiff's
efforts had been less than diligent, because he should have known from
the sheriff's return, and certainly did know from the filing of the motion
to quash, that the service was defective or at least questionable, and that he
thereby lost the benefit of the sixty-day saving provision. The supreme.
court held that the plaintiff was not required to take earlier action,
because it was "an orderly course to wait until that service had been set
aside before issuing an alias writ." In any event, the fact of service
within sixty days shows some diligence, and we would expect that as long
,as proper service is had within the sixty-day period, the plaintiff will not
be held to a strict accountability of his time and efforts to secure service
during that period.
The really dangerous situation for the plaintiff is not the case in
which the defect in the service of summons is apparent or is pointed out
by the defendant's action, but rather the case in which the service of
summons is apparently good, but for some reason not known to the
plaintiff it is in fact invalid. A common situation is the case in which the
2 8 OmoPHEv. CODE §2309.41 (11346).
29 116 Ohio St. 490, 157 N.E. 391 (1927).
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sheriff makes a return showing service upon the defendant at his "usual
place of residence." A large proportion of summonses are served in this
fashion, unless the plaintiff insists upon service upon the defendant in
person, for the sheriff, not finding the defendant at the address given for
him in the caption of the case, will ordinarily leave the summons at that
address, and report the service as accomplished. When defendant does not
reside at that address, the service is not good. The defendant is likely not
even to learn of the suit, and even though judgment be entered for his
failure to appear, he can at any time thereafter have the judgment set
aside."0 The sixty-day period for service will, of course, long since have
expired, and the plaintiff's action will be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, as it was never actually "commenced."
The plaintiff can minimize the risk of this result by verifying the
fact of defendant's residence before he designates it in the caption of the
petition, and by giving special instructions to the sheriff with respect to
service. Too many .times, however, the defendant's address is taken from
a police report, letterhead or other source of some age, which does not
reflect the correct address at the time of attempted service. When plaintiff
finds from the sheriff's return that residence service has been made, it is
time that he make some independent check to be sure; it is decidedly
unwise to depend upon the sheriff's recital.
An entry of general appearance by the defendant is, by statute, 3'
equivalent to service upon him and, if he has not been served earlier, the
action is commenced for application of the statute of limitations at the
time of such entry of appearance. 32
Accordingly, with the defendant's entry of appearance, plaintiff
will feel some assurance that the action has been commenced, but there
are instances in which even this may be misleading. In Fiegi v. Lopar-
kovch 3 defendant was a minor, sued and served with summons as an
adult. The petition was filed about a month after the accident which
produced the plaintiff's injuries, so that the plaintiff had in nowise slept
on his rights. Defendant filed a motion against the petition, without dis-
closing that he was a minor; and several months later filed a motion to
quash the summons on the ground of his minority, which was thereafter
sustained. The next step was the filing of an amended petition against
defendant's guardian as the sole defendant; several other motions and
pleadings were filed by the plaintiff and the guardian; but no correct
service upon the defendant as a minor was attempted until after the
statute of limitations had expired. A guardian ad litem was then appointed
for the minor defendant and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
30 See Hayes v. Kentucky Bank, 125 Ohio St. 359, 181 N.E. 542 (1932).
31 OHio REv. CoDE §2703.09 (11287).
32 Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E. 2d 608 (1942); Russell v.
Drake, infra note 36.
33 38 Ohio App. 338, 176 N.E. 670 (1930).
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the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Both the trial and
appellate courts held that the action was barred because .the minor de-
fendant was never properly served as a minor within the period of the
statute, and as the minor was incapable of waiving compliance with the
statutes relating to service, none of the motions filed by him or on his
behalf nor his guardian's answer, constituted an entry of appearance.
Accordingly, the action was icommenced only when he was served, which
was after the statute of limitations had expired.
In Templeman v. HesterA4 the court of appeals for Hamilton
County had a similar case and came to the same conclusion on this point.35
And in Russell 'v. Drake,"8 decided earlier this year, the court of appeals
of Cuyahoga County divided in a similar situation on the question of
whether the defendant's activity in defending during minority constituted
such entry of appearance as would commence the action within the
statute of limitations. The majority of the court held that where the
defendant, a minor, was never served as a minor, the court did not ac-
quire jurisdiction over his person, and the action was not commenced,
until he filed a motion for continuance three days after the statute of
limitations had run. The case is an unusual example of the "hidden
defect" in service, and one cannot avoid some feeling of sympathy for
the plaintiff. The petition had been filed and summons served upon the
defendant as an adult, well within the statute of limitations. At the time
of the accident giving rise to plaintiff's claim, defendant was married,
and maintained his own home with his wife and child, and was almost
21 years old. When he was served with summons he was still not an
adult, but leave to plead was taken without disclosing his minority. His
answer did not disclose the fact. He then reached his majority, but did
nothing further of record in the case until the motion for continuance,
which occurred after the statute of limitations, had expired. He then
raised the question of the statute of limitations by motion to dismiss, and
for the first time plaintiff was apprised of the defective service. It was
then barely too late.
These results may be necessary to accord to minors the protection
intended for them by the legislature, but they represent a very real
problem to the plaintiff in case there is any doubt as to the age of the
defendant. An element of actual misleading of the plaintiff by the
defendant is involved, and, while this might well deprive another of his
right to plead the statute of limitations, the minor is not so affected.
Here, again, the plaintiff ought not assume the action to be commenced
simply because there appears to be no contest by the defendant of the
court's jurisdiction over his person, or pleading of the statute of limitations.
3465 Ohio App. 62, 29 N.E. 2d 216 (1940).
35But found an escape for the plaintiff. See discussion infra, p. 150-1. And
compare Haisman v. Crismar, 18 Ohio L Abs. 180 (1934).
36 123 N.E. 2d 654 (1955).
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THE EFFECT OF THE SAVING CLAUSE FOR CASES OF
FAILURE OTHERWISE THAN ON THE MERITS
Section 2305.19 of the Revised Code (11233) provides in part:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced,
if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited for the commencement of such action at the date of
reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the
cause of action survives, his representatives may commence a
new action within one year after such date. This provision
applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
. . . (Emphasis added)
Until recently, it has seemed probable that this section would apply
to save the plaintiff from the unhappy result just mentioned, where he
finds out that an apparently good service of summons was not served at
all and his action was not commenced. The section would seem to admit
this construction, since it says that it applies "in an action commenced,
or attempted to be commenced." This obviously refers to the "attempt"
mentioned in Section 2305.17. Some of the courts of appeal have held
that where summons is served upon the defendant, a motion to quash the
service is sustained and the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the
defendant, such dismissal was a "failure otherwise than on the merits" and
this saving clause operated to give the plaintiff an additional year to start
over again, without bar of the statute of limitations. In Templeman vi.
Hester" the court of appeals for Hamilton County held that, notwith-
standing the fact no valid service of summons was obtained in time to
commence the action under General Code Section 11230 (Ohio Revised
Code Section 2305.17), the plaintiff would have a year to recommence
under this saving clause if it were dismissed. The reasoning of the court
is none too clear, but it must necessarily proceed from a conclusion that
the action had been "attempted to be commenced" by the erroneous is-
suance of summons for the defendant as an adult within the statute of
limitations, even though no proper service of summons was made within
sixty days thereafter.
Haisman v. Crsmars involved another minor defendant served
originally as an adult. In this case the defendnt filed a motion to quash
the service of summons on the ground of her minority, after the statute
of limitations had run. The motion to quash was sustained and when she
was thereafter served with summons in the case, she pleaded the statute
of limitations. The court of appeals for Mahoning County held, on
these facts, that the action was "attempted to be commenced" with the
purported service upon the defendant as an adult and that the action was
in fact commenced with the service of summons upon her after she
37 See note 34 supra.
38 18 Ohio L. Abs. 180 (1934).
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attained majority and, although the statute of limitations had run, plain-
tiff's cause of action was preserved by Section 11233. The court regarded
the order quashing the original summons to be a failure otherwise than
on the merits, and since the valid service marking the commencement
occurred within a year thereafter, said the case fell within the saving
provision.
The only supreme court authority before these cases is the case of
Meisse v. McCoy's Administrator.29 In that case the summons dated
and issued within the statute of limitations was served by the sheriff on
the return day, and upon motion of the defendant the summons was
quashed for this reason. Thereafter, within a year, but after the statute
of limitations had expired, an alias summons was issued and served. At
that time the statute comparable to Section 2305.19 did not refer to an
attempted commencement, but applied where the action "has been com-
menced in due time." The defendant argued that without service, the
action had not been commenced and that the saving provision could there-
fore not apply. The supreme court decided that the defective service was
"only voidable" and "was sufficient to give the defendant a status in the
case" so that the action was sufficiently commenced, and the sustaining of
the motion to quash summons was such a failure, that the saving clause
operated.
Last year the supreme court decided that case of Kossutk v. Bear4
and threw the issue in doubt. Here plaintiff's cause of action arose from
an automobile accident in Lorain County. Plaintiff first filed a petition
in Cuyahoga County, where defendant apparently resided. The sheriff
returned the summons "not found." Plaintiff then filed a petition in the
Lorain County common pleas court just before the period of limitations
expired, but the summons in this case was also returned showing no
service had been made. More than three months after the statute of
limitations had run, the Lorain County action was dismissed by the court
without prejudice for failure of service. A month later the plaintiff filed
an amended petition in Cuyahoga County, secured service upon the
defendant under the provisions of the Non-Resident Motorists Act, Gen-
eral Code Section 6308-1 (Ohio Revised Code Section 2703.20), and
claimed by this service to have commenced an action within one year after
the dismissal of the Lorain County case which, he said, was a failure
otherwise than on the merits. The defendant pleaded the bar of the
statute of limitations, but the trial court and the court of appeals agreed
With plaintiff that a case was made for application of the one year saving
clause of Section 11233 (2305.19). The supreme court reversed and
rendered final judgment for the defendant, on the ground that the case
was not a proper application of the saving clause, since, it said, "No case
ever matured in Lorain County to the point where the court had any
39 17 Ohio St. 225 (1867).
40 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E. 2d 285 (1954).
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jurisdiction over the defendant or had any power to make any order
based upon the allegations of the petition so filed. There was no pending
case to be 'dismissed."' The case was obviously not "commenced" be-
cause of the want of service. Beyond this, the supreme court held that it
was not "attempted to be commenced" because there was no serzce
within sixty days.
It is not at all clear what the reference in Section 2305.19 to an
action "attempted to be commenced" now means. Manifestly, if there
has been an "attempt" followed by service within sixty days, the action is
"commenced" under Section 2305.17, and there is no need in Section
2305.19 for any reference to an action "attempted to be commenced."
It might be assumed that the phrase was included in Section 2309.19 to
cover some situation other than an action commenced under Section
2305.17. At first glance at least, it would seem that Kossuth v. Bear
strikes out of the saving clause for failure otherwise than on the merits
the provision for actions "attempted to be commenced." It may be that
the supreme court sees some difference between the case in which the
defendant has been served with defective summons and the case in which
defendant is not found at all, and would hold that the first instance con-
stituted an attempt to commence. The case of Meisse v. McCoy's .Ad-
ministrator4 ' did adopt the view that the summons which was actually
served, although defective, had some effect in giving the defendant "a
status in the case." The Meisse case, however, did not involve any deter-
mination of what constituted an attempted commencement, as the statute
then in effect did not contain any reference to it. Further, the case was
decided nearly 100 years ago. Finally, the supreme court in the Kossuth
case made no mention of it.
On the other hand, if the saving clause of Section 2305.19 were
applied to the situation in the Kossuth case, the result would seem in-
congruous. The plaintiff would only have to file his summons and
praecipe and see that summons is issued within the period of the statute
of limitations and wait until the court dismissed the case for want of
service; he would still have a year from the dislrhissal to start all over
again. If the legislature intended this result, there would not be much
point to the second paragraph of Section 2305.17, as the plaintiff would
not need this sixty-day-grace period in any event.
It will be interesting to see whether the Ohio courts follow the
Kossuth case where a purported service is made and is thereafter quashed.
Russell v. Drake 4 was decided January 12, 1955, after the Kossuth
case was reported. Here service on the minor was improper, but no motion
to quash was filed. The court held that the action was not commenced
until the entry of appearance by the defendant as an adult after the
statute of limitations had run. The court had more than a little trouble
4 1 See note 38 suPra.
42 See note 36 supra.
[Vol. 16
1955] COMMENCEMENT OF .4 CIVIL dCTION 153
with the case. It quoted from Templeman v. Hester,43 in which another
court of appeals, before the Kossuth case, had held the saving clause
upon failure otherwise than on the merits to be applicable, but distinguished
that case, saying, "Under the facts of the case now being considered, a
summons legally sufficient to bring the defendant into court was never
issued or served." (Emphasis added.) The court then quoted the supreme
court opinion in Kossuth v. Bear, but did not attempt to explain it. The
dissenting Judge thought that the Kossuth case was not analogous. Neither
the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed the availablity to the
plaintiff of the one year saving clause, although the majority in effect
denied it to plaintiff. It does not seem possible to predict the future course
of decisions on this point.
THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMENCEMENT SECTIONS
TO CASES INVOLVING SPECIAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
There are many statutes of limitations in the Ohio code applying to
particular actions which are not included within Chapter 2305 of the
Revised Code, entitled "Jurisdiction; Limitation of Action." The sections
of this title in general contain the limitations applicable to the common
law actions with certain exceptions, saving provisions such as Sections
2305.17 and 2305.19, and tolling provisions. We might call these
sections the general statutes of limitations, and those applying to specific
statutory actions, the special statutes. Examples of such special statutes are
the limitations on the wrongful death action in Sections 2125.02 and
2125.04, the action against a personal representative on a rejected claim
in Section 2117.14, and the actions for workmen's compensation benefits,
in Sections 4123.84 and 4123.85.
We have been examining Section 2305.17 which fixes the time of
commencement either at the date of the summons served or of the date
of the summons issued in an attempted service, where actual service is
obtained in sixty days thereafter. If this section is read literally, it applies
only to cases involving the general statutes of limitations. The first
paragraph of Section 2305.17, which was Ohio General Code Section
11230, reads:
An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to
2305.22, inclusive, and section 1307.08"4 of the revised code . . . at the
date of the summons which is served . . .
The second paragraph of Revised Code Section 2305.17, which was Ohio
General Code Section 11231, reads:
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to com-
mence an action is equivalent to its commencement....
It would seem, accordingly, that these sections are intended to fix the
43 See note 34 supra.
44 This was a special limitation on certain actions against banks, which was
formerly found in the chapter on "Limitations of Actions." Accordingly, when the
recodification occurred, moving it to another chapter, the reference had to be
retained to avoid change in effect of §11230.
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date of commencement only for the purpose of the general statute of
limitations, and that they would not apply to determine the time of
commencement of actions limited by the special statutes.4"
The difficulty with applying the section only to cases governed by the
general limitations is this-if Section 2305.17 cannot be applied to deter-
mine when an action governed by a special limitation is commenced,
there is no code provision which does, and we have no way of determining
when such a special action is commenced, except perhaps by reference to
Section 2703.01, providing that "A civil action must be commenced by
filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition, and causing
a summons to issue thereon." Suppose an administrator files a petition
joining two causes of action, one for the benefit of the estate for personal
injuries and expenses resulting to his decedent, and the other for the
wrongful death of the decedent. Although the two causes of action are
governed by different statutes of limitations,4" both afford a two-year
period for commencement, and if both causes of action accrued on the
same day, as frequently happens, both statutes of limitations will expire
at the same time. Suppose further that the petition is filed close to the
expiration date and summons issues within the limitation period but is not
served, and no service is had within sixty days thereafter. If a court on
these facts should apply Section 2305.17 literally, it would have to con-
lude that the cause of action for personal injuries was barred upon the
expiration of the statute, but it could conclude that the wrongful death
case was commenced with the issuance of summons. Or, if the plaintiff
obtained service under favor of the sixty-day saving clause, the court would
have to say that this saved the personal injury action, but that it was not
available as to the wrongful death action.
Generally, the courts have avoided the question and have assumed
that the provisions of 2305.17 apply beyond the chapter in which the
section is found. Except for an occasional comment,4" the question has
not been much discussed. It was necessarily involved in the will contest
45 Section 11230 of the OHio GEN. CODE read: "An action shall be deemed to
be commenced 'within the meaning of this chapter. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Section 11231 provided: "Within the meaning of this chapter an attempt to com-
mence an action shall be deemed -to be equivalent to its commencement. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) These sections had existed in substantially this form since the
first Code of Civil Procedure of 1853 (51 Ohio Laws 57, c. 1202, §20) and were
found in the chapter on Limitation of Actions. The quesion is therefore not
created by the code revision.
46 Section 2305.10 governs the personal injury claim, §2125.02 the wrongful
death claim.
4 7 E.g., Judge Zimmerman's dissent in Draher v. Walters, 130 Ohio St. 92,
at 98: "I am unable to see how Section 11230, General Code, has any bearing on a
case of this kind..-.. The phrase 'within the meaning of this chapter' can only
have reference to the chapter in which the section is found, entitled 'Limitation of
Actions'. ... "
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cases discussed above4" in which the supreme court was determining
whether the executor was "united in interest" with the heirs or legatees,
as only by assuming the application of General Code Section 11230
(2305.17) to a will contest case involving a special statute of limitations,
could the question become important. If this section did not apply to
save the plaintiff, his service upon one of a class was of no consequence as
to the others in the class.
In 1942 the supreme court was faced squarely with the question,
in a case that presented initially a somewhat different but comparable
question. This was the interesting case of Crandall v. Irwin.4" This was
an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien under Section 8323-3 of the
General Code (Revised Code Section 1311.19). Section 8321 (Revised
Code Section 1311.13) required it to be commenced within six years
from the filing of the affidavit for lien with the county recorder. Four
days before the six-year period ran out, the petition was filed and sum-
mons issued. The summons was returned "not found," but about two
years thereafter the defendants filed a waiver of summons and entry of
appearance. Plaintiff claimed the six-year statute was tolled by the absence
of defendants from the state by virtue of Section 11228' (2305.15), so
that excluding the period of absence in the time computation, the entry of
appearance fell within the six-year limitation. The court first had the
question whether the tolling provision applied to statutes of limitations not
found in the chapter on limitations, because Section 11228 read: "the
period of limitation for the commencement of the action as provided in
this chapter shall not -begin to run until he comes into the state." (Em-
phasis added.) The supreme court held that the action was commenced
too late because, among other reasons, the saving clause in question af-
forded relief only from the general statutes of limitations, and did not
apply to extend the time for foreclosing a mechanic's lien. This apparently
suggested to Crandall that if the tolling provision was limited by its lan-
guage to the general statutes of limitations, General Code Sections 11230
and 11231, the sections fixing the time for commencement did not apply
to his case either, because of similar limiting language, so that the failure to
serve the summons had not prevented commencement of his action so long
as it was issued in time. He filed an application for rehearing which was
granted and made this contention. The supreme court then squarely faced
our question, i.e., whether the statutes dealing with time of commencement
apply only to cases involving the general statutes of limitations. In the
syllabus of the opinion on rehearing the supreme court said:
1. Section 11279, General Code, prescribes the manner
of commencing a civil action, i.e., by filing in the office of the
48 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E. 2d 608, on rehearing, 139 Ohio St. 463, 40 N.E.
2d 933 (1942).
49 McCord v. McCord, 104 Ohio St. 274, 135 N.E. 548 (1922); Draher v.
Waiters, 130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935) ; Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177,
93 N.E. 2d 683 (1950).
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clerk of the proper court a petition and* causing summons to be
issued thereon.
2. Sections 11230 and 11231, General Code, prescribe
the time of commencing all civil actions. . . . (Italics are the
Court's)
The effect of the decision, of course, is to strike out from Revised Code
Section 2305.17 the apparent limitation "within the meaning of such
secti6ns" and to make the rules for determining commencement the
same whether the action is a common law action or created by statute.
We believe the result is sensible, even though there is an apparent
inconsistency in applying these sections to determine the time of com-
mencement, and in refusing to afford the plaintiff the benefit of the tolling
provisions. Other reasons are usually given for the refusal to toll the
special limitations."u
While the court's statement that Sections 11230 and 11231
Revised Code Section (2305.17) prescribe the time of commencing all
civil actions is too broad, in that the court does not say "for statute of
limitations cases only,"5" it is clear as a result of subsequent decisions that
this is what it means.52
50 Primarily, that in statutory actions the limitation period is a part of the
right and cannot therefore be tolled or extended. See note 20 supra.
51 See cases cited note 2 supra.
52 In Pilgrim Distributing Corp. v. Galsworthy, Inc., 148 Ohio St. 567, 76
N.E. 2d 382 (1947) and Consumers Plumbing and Heating Supply Co. v. Chicago
Pottery Co., 155 Ohio St. 373, 98 N.E. 2d, 823 (1951), the supreme court again had
the question whether the action had been "commenced" so as to support attachment
before summons was served. In the Consumers Plumbing and Heating Supply Co.
case the defendant claimed that the attachment was premature when made after
the summons was issued but before the first publication for service. It contended
that Crandall v. Irwin had modified the earlier decisions which held attachment
valid in such cases, so that service was now required in accordance with §2307.15,
before the cause could be deemed "commenced" for any purpose. The court held
that the action was commenced for purposes of attachment with the issuance of
summons, reaffirming the decisions prior to the Crandall case, and noted that the
Crandall case presented a question of the statute of limitations, therdby apparently
distinguishing it.
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